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A Failure of Conscience: How Pakistan’s Devastating
Floods Compare to America’s Experience During Katrina
by Oded Cedar*

A

mericans, seeing the destruction this summer from floods
in Pakistan, cannot help but draw comparisons to the
devastation in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina.1
Both raised serious questions about governmental response to
natural disasters,2 although the failings of both governments do
not permit easy comparisons.3 Despite the differences between
the two, Pakistan can learn from the U.S. response to Katrina: that
with overcrowding in urban areas4 and limited resources, Pakistan
will likely be unable to overcome the geographic challenges of
evacuation. Instead, Pakistan must rely on flood prevention techniques, primarily in its cities, as its central line of defense.
Various natural and human causes contributed to the flooding
in Pakistan. Two leading preventable causes were deforestation and
waterway planning.5 For years, the “timber mafia” has plundered
Pakistan’s forests, reducing the country’s tree cover from 14% to
5.2% in the last seventy-five years.6 Pakistan’s forests provide an
essential defense against floods by trapping water and breaking
up forceful currents.7 Because of their loss, floodwaters rose with
unprecedented rapidity.8 Adding to the catastrophe, the floodwaters
swept away the illegally harvested logs, which destroyed bridges
and filled the dams meant to defend against flooding.9 Illicit loggers
act with impunity in Pakistan through representation in the government and by bribing politicians.10 By corrupting elements of Pakistan’s government, the “timber mafia” destroyed Pakistan’s most
important natural defenses against flooding.
Pakistan’s waterway infrastructure also exacerbated the damage from flooding. The waterway system was built to benefit
wealthy landowners, without regard for environmental impacts or
flood prevention.11 After the floods, Prime Minister Gilani claimed
that a proposed dam at Kalabagh would have averted much of the
devastation.12 But his belief in the ability of large dams to prevent
flooding is misplaced.13 The Kalabagh dam project is meant to
take pressure off the weakening Tarbela dam.14 Like the Mangla
and Tarbela dams, Kalabagh’s dual objectives are hydro-electrical
and agricultural, not flood control.15 Studies show that the Mangla
and Tarbela dams actually increased the severity of flooding.16 The
Taunsa Barrage, one of Pakistan’s most vulnerable water diversion
mechanisms, also increased flooding by routing water to higher
grounds that do not normally flood.17 Many worry that the Kalabagh
dam will simply be another ticking time bomb for future floods.18
Historically, Pakistan’s dams are the product of centralized
decision-making to increase agricultural and electrical output, with
little input from environmentalists or local communities.19 Environmental organizations have criticized Pakistan’s water system engineers for paying insufficient attention to the environmental effects
of large dam projects.20 One such effect, sedimentation, worsens
Fall 2010

flooding by raising riverbeds and minimizing the capacity of dams
to hold water.21 By ignoring the environmental impacts of these
large projects Pakistan’s government missed an opportunity to mitigate the flooding and instead made it worse.22
Pakistan’s flood policy failed for different reasons than did
the U.S. government’s during Hurricane Katrina. The levees
failed during Katrina because the U.S Army Corps of Engineers
did not design them to withstand a storm surge from a Category 5 hurricane, and because all levels of government failed to
maintain the levees, which caused them to leak and give way.23
The decision to reduce levee maintenance funding in the months
prior to Katrina exemplifies the federal government’s failure.24
But, despite the overwhelming evidence of government mismanagement, government investigations found no evidence of
corruption or class favoritism in the case of Katrina.25 Still, Pakistan can learn from America’s experience.
Even the United States, with all its resources and access to
timely information,26 could not effectively evacuate masses of
people.27 With its limited resources,28 Pakistan cannot rely on
evacuation. The current flooding in Pakistan left ten million people
displaced and submerged twenty percent of the country.29 Pakistan
spreads across more than 300,000 miles,30 almost ten times the area
of New Orleans,31 with a population of about 170 million,32 compared to 223,000 residents in New Orleans.33 The national government is weakened by constantly bickering provincial authorities.34
Most of Pakistan’s population lives in rural areas along the Indus riverbanks.35 However, migration caused an annual urban population
growth of three percent.36 Urban decay, overcrowding, and weak
infrastructure in the cities create vulnerable pockets of dense population.37 These factors make an effective evacuation exceedingly difficult, and the shaky Pakistani government risks further destabilization
if it does not prepare appropriately for the next flood.38
The government cannot rely on evacuation to cope with future
floods. Instead, Pakistan must look to flood prevention. The cities
must be Pakistan’s central focus, as the weakened rural areas will
drive more people to the cities.39 Nationally, the government must
legislate to conserve the remaining forests, and invest in reforestation.40 It must adopt a cost–benefit analysis for large dam construction that accounts for flood mitigation, sedimentation, and
population displacement.41 Finally, the international community,
speaking through organizations such as the World Bank, must
fund projects that further flood prevention.42
Endnotes: A Failure of Conscience on page 70
* Oded Cedar is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University Washington College of Law

46

67

See id. at 54.
See id. at 56, 46.
69 See Jourdan, Enhancing HOPE VI, supra note 64, at 9.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 9-11.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 9.
76 See id. at 9-10.
77 See id. at 11.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 Jourdan, Reducing Pre-Relocation Grief, supra note 64, at 63; Jourdan,
Enhancing HOPE VI, supra note 64, at 14.
81 Jourdan, Enhancing HOPE VI, supra note 64, at 12-13.
82 Id. at 11.
83 Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the “Right”
Thing to Do, 27 Pace L. Rev. 869, 872 (2007).
84 Id. at 875.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925).
89 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
90 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children’s Rights, in Handbook of Youth
and Justice 377, 398-99 (Susan O. White ed., 2001) (explaining that “the idea
that children must be provided with advocates whose role is to represent the
child, not the parent or the state, is becoming firmly established”); Elrod, supra
note 83, at 912 (arguing that “a child who has the capacity to direct litigation
should be able to do so”).
91 Fla. Stat. § 163.3167 (2010).
92 Fla. Stat. § 163.3184 (2010).
93 Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So.2d 191, 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
94 Id. at 207, 209.
95 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 497 (1975) (explaining that “the question
of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits
of the dispute or of particular issues”).
96 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
68

97

16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g)(1).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
99 Id. at 560.
100 Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); quoting Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 155 (1990)).
103 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
104 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
105 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
106 Id. at 562.
107 Id. at 563-64.
108 Id. at 564.
109 Raymond A. Just, Intergenerational Standing Under the Endangered Species Act: Giving Back the Right to Biodiversity After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 597, 607 (1996).
110 Oposa v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res., 33 I.L.M. 173 (1994).
111 Id. at 185.
112 Id. at 176-77.
113 Id. at 176, 183.
114 Id. at 177.
115 Id. at 176.
116 Id. at 185.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 185-86.
119 Id. at 198.
120 See Dante B. Gatmaytan, The Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa
v. Factoran as Pyrrhic Victory, 15 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 457, 467 (2003)
(stating that the plaintiffs in Oposa dropped their suit upon the Supreme Court’s
remand of their case to the trial court, and that commercial timbering continued).
121 See Gregory F. Maggio, Inter/intra-generational Equity: Current Applications under International Law for Promoting the Sustainable Development of
Natural Resources, 4 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 161, 192 (1997).
122 See id. at 208-09, 214.
123 See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Right of the Child to a Clean Environment,
23 S. Ill. U. L.J. 611, 652 (1999) (arguing that a child’s right to a clean environment ought to be tied to a child’s right to achieve environmental justice).
98

Endnotes: A Failure of Conscience: How Pakistan's Devastating Floods Compare to America's Experience
		
During Katrina continued from page 46
1

See Cheree Franco, Can Pakistan Learn from Katrina?, The Express TriWorld Blog, http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/1258/can-pakistan-learnfrom-katrina/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
2 See Snehal Shingavi, From Natural Disaster to Social Catastrophe, SocialistWorker (Aug. 16, 2010), http://socialistworker.org/2010/08/16/disaster-tosocial-catastrophe (noting failures of Pakistan’s infrastructure and actions by
government officials that call into question their ability to protect the population
during floods); U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, H.R. Rep. No. 109-377, at 1-5 (2006)
[hereinafter House Report] http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/fullreport.
pdf (discussing the failure of government at all levels to prepare and respond to
Hurricane Katrina).
3 See Shingavi, supra note 2 (citing Pakistan’s dam and canal system built to
benefit wealthy landowners); Peter Bosshard & Shannon Lawrence, The World
Bank’s Conflicted Corruption Fight, International Rivers (May 1, 2006),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/south-asia/pakistan/world-bank’s-conflictedcorruption-fight (discussing corruption in Pakistan’s water sector); A Land
Left to Drown by the ‘Timber Mafia’, The Herald Scotland (Aug. 29, 2010),
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/world-news/a-land-left-to-drown-by-thetimber-mafia-1.1051230 (reporting a local Pakistani journalist’s story about
government collaboration with the “timber mafia”); House Report, supra note
2, at 359-62 (drawing conclusions about the failure of the U.S. federal, state,
and local government to appropriately plan for Hurricane Katrina).
4 See CIA World Fact Book: Pakistan, Cent. Intelligence Agency, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html (last visited
Oct. 23, 2010) (providing statistical data about urban population growth from
bune

Fall 2010

2005 to 2010).
See Medha Bisht, Pakistan Floods: Causes and Consequences, Inst. for
Defence Studies and Analyses (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/PakistanFloodsCausesandConsequences_mbisht_190810 (asserting
that a variety of natural and man-made causes led to the flooding in Pakistan);
Shingavi, supra note 2 (noting the failure of Pakistan’s waterway system to
adequately protect against flooding); Alex Rodriguez, Pakistan Flood Crisis
Blamed Partly on Deforestation, L.A. Times (Oct. 13, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/13/world/la-fg-pakistan-logging-20101013 (noting the role
of deforestation in exacerbating the flooding).
6 See Peter Gizewski & Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity
and Violent Conflict: The Case of Pakistan, pt. 2 (Apr. 1996), http://www.
library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/pakistan/pak2.htm (noting that the Pakistani government and the “timber mafia” have exploited the forests and caused heavy
deforestation that eliminates much of the tree cover in the country). Several
other articles published after the floods provide statistics of deforestation and
the role of the “timber mafia” from different regions and provinces around
Pakistan. See also Bisht, supra note 5; Rodriguez, supra note 5; A Land Left to
Drown, supra note 3; Amir Mohammad Khan, ‘Timber Mafia’ Made Floods
Worse (Aug. 17, 2010, 8:12 PM), http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/floodofmisery/2010/08/201081614111704604.html; Pakistan Floods and the Timber
Mafia, United Press Int’l (Sep. 2, 2010, 2:56 PM), http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/09/02/Pakistan-flods-and-the-timber-mafia/
UPI-92421283453799.
7 See Khan, supra note 6 (quoting the head of Pakistan’s Forest Institute that
forests play an important role in mitigating the force of floods).
8 Id. (discussing the role of “inadequate forest cover” that allowed the flood
5

70

waters to rise quickly); Id. (noting that Shakil Quadir, the provincial head of the
National Disaster Management Authority (“NDMA”), estimates that if Pakistan
had preserved twenty to twenty-five percent of its original tree cover, the flooding would have been greatly mitigated).
9 See Bisht, supra note 5 (noting that timber stored away for transportation
was washed away in the flood, destroying bridges and dams); see also Khan,
supra note 6.
10 See A Land Left to Drown, supra note 3 (noting that the “timber mafia” has
representatives in Pakistan’s government and connections with the military);
Gizewski, supra note 6 (providing a brief history of the development of “timber
mafia” entrenchment in the government).
11 See Peter Gizewski & Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and
Violent Conflict: The Case of Pakistan, pt. 1 (Apr. 1996), http://www.library.
utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/pakistan/pak1.htm (discussing the construction of large
dams and other “mega projects” without consideration for the social impacts);
Shaheen Rafi Khan, The Kalabagh Controversy, at 8-10, http://www.sanalist.org/Acrobat/A-14.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (highlighting the adverse
environmental affects of large dams built in Pakistan); Shingavi, supra note
2 (asserting the general claim that Pakistan’s waterway infrastructure benefits
only wealthy landowners); Bosshard & Lawrence, supra note 3 (noting the
ways in which Pakistan’s waterway infrastructure has supported wealthy elites
and landowners).
12 See Kalabagh Dam Could Have Averted Destruction of Floods: PM
Gilani, PakTribune (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.
shtml?230425 (directly quoting Prime Minister Gilani’s statement regarding the
devastation caused by the flooding).
13 See Khan, supra note 11, at 8 (asserting that large dams provide little as a
flood prevention mechanism).
14 See id. at 1 (discussing the controversy of the Kalabagh dam as a replacement for the Tarbela dam).
15 Khan’s study of the Kalabagh dam project indicates that supporters of the
dam are largely in favor of the project for its increase in agricultural and hydroelectrical output. Yet, as Khan shows, there is sufficient evidence to prove that
the environmental impacts of the dam will mirror the negative impacts of past
large dams on the Indus river valley ecosystem. See id. at 8-10.
16 The Mangla and Tarbela Dams were completed in 1967 and 1974 respectively. Table 4 of Dr. Khan’s study provides figures that show no reduction in
the lives lost, villages affected, or area affected by floods since the construction
of the dams. If these large dams were built to prevent flood damage (which they
were not) then presumably there would be a reduction in lives lost and villages
affected. See id. at tbl. 4.
17 See Mushtaq Gaadi, Understanding the Flood Disaster at Taunsa Barrage,
Int’l Rivers (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/5723
(describing the causes that led to flooding at the Taunsa Barrage, a key failure
in Pakistan’s waterway system that contributed to the devastation).
18 See id. (expressing a general concern about the use of reasoning by engineers
to justify the construction of the Kalabagh dam); see also Khan, supra note 11,
at 6-9 (providing evidence as to the ecological harm and concerns of sedimentation that would occur from construction of the Kalabagh dam).
19 See Khan, supra note 11, at 1, 8 (highlighting the selective use of data by
the Pakistani government, and a historical system of centralized decision making that ignores the concerns of local communities).
20 See Peter Gizewski & Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and
Violent Conflict: The Case of Pakistan, pt. 3 (Apr. 1996), http://www.library.
utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/pakistan/pak3.htm (noting that planners of large dams have
consistently neglected the impacts on groundwater, local water quality, etc.).
21 See Gaadi, supra note 17 (citing the impact of sedimentation, specifically at
the Taunsa Barrage, which led to the flooding of higher grounds).
22 See id. (using the Taunsa Barrage as an example of the larger effect that
large dam projects had in exacerbating the flooding).

23

House Report, supra note 2, at 87-97 (discussing the role of the U.S. Army
Corp of Engineers in failing to design the levees with the ability to withstand a
Category 5 hurricane, and the continued operation of the levees with the knowledge that they would not withstand such a hurricane. Also, discussing the failure of federal, state, and local government to appropriately maintain the levees,
which led to leaking even prior to Hurricane Katrina).
24 See Will Bunch, Why the Levee Broke, AlterNet (Sept. 1, 2005), http://
www.alternet.org/story/24871/?page=entire (discussing several instances where
people in charge of maintaining the levees reported a lack of funding from the
federal government to complete the maintenance projects).
25 Nothing in the U.S. House Report indicates that class favoritism or government corruption played a role in the government failures to prepare and respond
to Katrina. See House Report, supra note 2.
26 See id. at 1 (noting that the U.S. government is the world’s largest purchaser
of intelligence and information, and it could still not respond quickly enough to
Hurricane Katrina).
27 See id. at 103-04, 108-23 (discussing the failure of local officials to evacuate
a larger portion of the population in a timely manner from New Orleans and
Jefferson Parish despite the successful evacuations in Mississippi, Alabama,
and other affected parts of Louisiana).
28 See Gizewski, pt. 1, supra note 11 (highlighting the economic, geographic,
and demographic diversity of Pakistan); CIA World Fact Book: Pakistan, supra
note 4 (noting that Pakistan only has about 125,000 miles of paved roads and
about 3,500 miles of railways ranking 20th and 28th respectively in the world).
29 See Michael Georgy, Pakistan Floods Cost $9.7 Bln in Damage: ADB/
WBank, Reuters (Oct. 14, 2010 12:19 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/s/
nm/20101014/pl_nm/us_pakistan_floods_damage_2/print (providing recent
statistics about the floods in Pakistan); Pakistan Floods and the Timber Mafia,
supra note 5 (noting that the floods submerged about twenty percent of Pakistan).
30 See CIA World Fact Book: Pakistan, supra note 4 (providing data about
Pakistan’s size).
31 See State and County Quickfacts: New Orleans (city), U.S. Census Bureau,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/2255000.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
32 See Population Census Organization, http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/
(last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
33 See State and County Quickfacts: New Orleans (city), supra note 31.
34 See Gizewski, pt. 1, supra note 11 (discussing the consistent battle over
resources between provinces).
35 See id. (describing geographic distribution of the population, and noting that
most of the population is rural and lives along riverbanks).
36 See CIA World Facts Book: Pakistan, supra note 4 (providing statistical data
regarding urban population growth between 2005-2010); Gizewski, pt. 3, supra
note 20 (highlighting the effects of population growth on urban decay).
37 See Gizewski, pt. 3, supra note 20 (noting the adverse effects of the urban
population boom on the structure of Pakistani cities).
38 See Bisht, supra note 5 (noting the fragile relationship between the general
population and the government, and recognizing that a lack of response by the
government could elevate the anger of the people).
39 Gizewski and Homer-Dixon note that Pakistani’s are already swarming to
the cities where there is comparatively more prosperity than in rural areas. The
flooding destroyed much of Pakistan’s ability to produce crops. It is likely that
more people will flood to the cities, where shelter, food, services, and opportunity are more likely than in the isolated rural areas. See Gizewski, pt. 3, supra
note 20.
40 See Khan, supra note 6 (quoting the NDMA regional director about securing
lands that were affected by the floods because of deforestation).
41 See Khan, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing the new approach to large dam
projects).
42 See Bosshard & Lawrence, supra note 3 (providing historical data about the
World Bank’s investment in Pakistani waterway infrastructure).

Endnotes: Out of the Garden of Eden: Moving Beyond the Rights-Based Agenda in the Urban Sector
		
continued from page 49
21

Id.
Id.
23 Sheela Patel, Sundar Burra & Celine D’Cruz, Slum/Shack Dwellers International–Foundations to Treetops, 13:1 Env’t & Urbanization 45 (2001), available at http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd26/enurb/v13n2/45.pdf.
24 Sheela Patel, Celine d’Cruz & Sundar Burra, Beyond Evictions in a Global
22

71

City: People Managed Resettlement in Mumbai, 14 Env’t & Urbanization
159, 163 (2002), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/drivers_urb_
change/urb_infrastructure/pdf_city_planning/IIED_patel_Evictions.pdf.
25 Celine d’Cruz & David Satterthwaite, The Role of Urban Grassroots Organizations and Their National Federations in Reducing Poverty and Achieving the
Millennium Development Goals, Global Urban Dev. Mar. 2006, at 1, http://www.

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

